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SAFEGUARDS AND STANDARDS FOR PLEDGE
FORECLOSURES*
FORECLOSURE of loans secured by pledged collateral often brings the valid
interests of borrower and lender into sharp conflict. Since a borrower who has
defaulted is liable for a deficiency judgment if the pledge is sold for less than
his debt.' and is entitled to the surplus if the pledge is sold for more than his
debt,2 he wants the pledge sold at the highest possible price. The lender, on the
other hand, has no incentive to work to obtain a surplus for the borrower. And
the lender may even want to buy the collateral himself at a low price, in the
hope of reselling at a profit. Secondly, the lender wants to be free to foreclose
promptly upon default and to sell the pledged collateral expeditiously, since
delay may prolong an unprofitable commitment of the lender's funds and in-
creases the risk of a drop in the value of the collateral. Consequently, he de-
mands a free hand in selecting the time, manner and place of sale. But the
borrower generally wants a liberal period of time between default and the fore-
closure sale in order to permit both parties to advertise and search for buyers,
preserve his opportunity to redeem the pledge and put off the day of deficiency
judgment. 3 The borrower, however, can seldom negotiate contractual protec-
tion against the danger of the lender buying the collateral at an inadequate
price or selling it hastily, since he generally has an inferior bargaining posi-
tion 4 at the time the loan is made. Borrowers must therefore seek protection
when the collateral is sold by invoking judicial supervision of foreclosure pro-
cedures.
'In the Matter of Kiamie, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955).
I. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 132 (2d ed. 1955) ; JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITIES
,AND PLEDGES § 597 (3d ed. 1912).
2. BROwN, op. cit. supra, § 132; JONES, op. cit. supra, § 649.
3. Cf. Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the Deficiency Judgment, 20 VA. L. REv.
719, 721-22 (1934) (discussing state redemption laws which give hard pressed mortgagors
a certain period of time--commonly a year-in which they may redeem property sold
under judicial foreclosure).
For the difference between pledges, chattel mortgages, real estate mortgages, etc., see
B OwN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 128 (2d ed. 1955) ; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1379 (3d
ed. 1939) ; Gilmore, Antrican Chattel Security Devices, 2 Bus. L. REV. 65 (1955).
4. "[A]greements... are drawn by the pledgee usually upon expert legal advice, and
are exacted from the borrower, who -by reasons of financial necessity has no other option
than to accept them.... ." BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 661 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 48, comment e (1941). See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--Soine Thoughts
about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLU-M. L. REv. 629, 632-33 (1943) ("Standard contracts
are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need
of the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms...
because all competitors use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection
more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences
are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.") ; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv.
L. RLv. 700, 702-03 (1939) ; note 10 infra.
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The courts normally seek to balance the interests of the parties by scrutiniz-
ing the pledgee's conduct in selling the collateral. The courts do not follow the
policy of rigid supervision, the judicial sale, prevalent in other types of fore-
closure.5 For judicial sales are time-consuming and costly; 6 more important,
since they are public auctions, judicial sales often will not bring as high a price
as could be obtained by selling the pledge through the normal commercial
channels of distribution.7 Instead, the pledgee may sell the collateral himself
without prior judicial approval, but case law has developed rules prescribing
the manner of sale. Courts forbid private sales, prohibit the pledgee from buy-
ing the collateral himself," and require adequate advertising and reasonable
notice to the borrower. 9 In virtually all pledge agreements, however, the bor-
rower waives these common law safeguards. 10 Although the waivers are nor-
mally a product of unequal bargaining positions," they are generally upheld
on a freedom of contract rationale. 12 Courts nevertheless afford the borrower
5. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 133 (2d ed. 1955) ; JoNES, COLLATERA.L SECURITIES
AND PLEDGES § 7589 (3d ed. 1912). In former times the courts required judicial foreclosure
on pledges as well as on mortgages. See Judge Kent's discussion in Cortelyou v. Lansing,
2 Caines Cas. 200, 204, 213 (N.Y. 1805), doubting the legality of nonjudicial pledge fore-
closure even at that time.
In the case of mortgages, judicial forclosure is required in some states, and it is pre-
ferred in most states. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 318 (1951). In bankruptcy sales, there must
first be an appraisal, then public sale unless otherwise ordered by the court. MooRE, BANK-
RUPTCY MANUAL 218,923 (1939).
6. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 337 n.20 (1-951). See also Turner, An English View of
Mortgage Deficiency Judgments, 21 VA. L. REv. 601, 603, 608 (1935) (criticizing the "ex-
pensive practice of sale through the courts rather than under a power of sale" in the mort-
gage field).
7. "[I]t is hoped that private sale will be encouraged where, as is frequently the case,
private sale through commercial channels will result in higher realization on collateral for
the benefit of all parties." UNIFORM CommERciAL CODE § 9-504, comment (1).
8. Public sale required: De Moville v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 233 Ala. 204, 212,
170 So. 756, 763 (1936) ; Evans v. Odum, 52 Ga. App. 453, 183 S.E. 669 (1936) ; Rykers
v. Allen, 7 Hill 497, 499 (N.Y. 1844). Pledgee cannot buy in: Easton v. German-American
Bank, 127 U.S. 532 (1888) ; Winchester v. Joslyn, 31 Colo. 220, 72 Pac. 1079 (1903) ; Glid-
den v. Mechanics Nat'l Bank, 53 Ohio St. 588, 42 N.E. 995 (1895).
9. Reasonable notice of timhe and place: Guinzburg v. H. W. Downs Co., 165 Mass.
467, 43 N.E. 195 (1896) ; Moss Industries Inc. v. Irving Metal Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 704, 61
A.2d 159 (1948) ; Chambers v. Carlyon, 188 Wash. 352, 62 P.2d 726 (1936). Adverise-
ment: De Moville v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, supra note 8; Bryson v. Rayner, 25 Md.
423 (1866). See, generally, BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 657-58 (2d ed. 1955). For sum-
mary of statutory requirements, see Note, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 1087 n.2 (1941).
10. See Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreements, 29 HAmv. L. REv. 277, 278-79
(1916) ; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 48, comment b (1941). Such agreements can be found
in mid-nineteenth century cases, e.g., Wilson v. J. Little & Co., 1 Sandf. 350, 351 (N.Y.
1848), and they reappear in similar form in nearly all modern cases dealing with pledge
foreclosure.
11. See note 4 sipra.
12. See cases collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1381, 1388-97 (1954) ; note 10 "4pra.
Contra, Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Central Constr. Co., 17 App. D.C. 524, 543-44 (1901) (dictum)
(waiver of all common law rules would be void as against public policy); cf. Scott v.
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some protection: they interpret pledge agreements strictly against the pledgee,' 3
impose on the pledgee high standards of good faith ' 4 and readily find that the
lledgee by his actions waived his own rights.' 5 But of these three, the doctrine
of waiver by the pledgee is often the only available means of protecting the
borrower. For strict interpretation can be vitiated by careful drafting and,' 6
except in extreme situations, good faith is hard to judge in retrospect. 17
The recent case of In the Matter of Kiarnie Is illustrates the inherent dif-
ficulty of balancing the interests of lender and borrower after the borrower has
National City Bank, 107 Fla. 818, 829, i46 So. 573, 575 (1933) (waiver of statutory notice
requirement invalid) ; Burke v. Tarrant Inv. Co., 166 Okla. 179, 26 P.2d 949 (1933) (waiver
of statutory requirement of public sale and notice invalid).
In the mortgage field, power of sale clauses waiving the requirement of judicial fore-
closure and allowing private sale are generally held to be valid, in the absence of statutory
provisions to the contrary. Durfee & Dodderidge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale, 23
MIcH. L. REv. 825, 832 n.28 (1925) ; 3 JONEs, MORTGAGES § 2404 (8th ed. 1928) ; 2 WILT-
SIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE § 639 (5th ed. 1939). Contra, 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 100
(1943). However, in several farm states power of sale as a method of mortgage fore-
closure is prohibited by statute, and in only eighteen jurisdictions is this method generally
used. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 337 (1951).
13. See, e.g., Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harnwell, 158 Ark. 295, 250 S.W. 321
(1923) ; (authorization of "private sale" means sale to a third party, not to the pledgee) ;
Cole v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 164 Misc. 741, 299 N.Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
("private sale" construed to require some negotiation with third parties, even though
pledgee becomes buyer). See also Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreenents, 29 HARv. L.
RPv. 277, 279-81 (1916) ; cases collected in Annots., 37 A.L.R.2d 1381, 1390-92 (1954);
76 A.L.R. 705,718-22 (1932).
14. Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Central Constr. Co., 17 App. D.C. 524, 544 (1901) ("utmost
fairness and good faith") ; Coleman v. Solomon, 225 Ala. 407, 143 So. 576 (1932) (sale
must be fair and open) ; United Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 30 Ariz. 557, 564-65, 249 Pac.
747, 749 (1926) (pledgee "bound to the observance of good faith and a suitable regard for
the interests of his principal") ; Highland v. Davis, 119 W. Va. 501, 513-14, 195 S.E. 604,
610 (1937) (good faith and a reasonable degree of skill and diligence to secure a fair price).
Courts qften speak of the pledgee as in a "trust" or "trustlike relationship." Dibert v.
Wernicke, 214 Fed. 673, 680 (6th Cir. 1914) ; Highland v. Davis, szpra at 513, 195 S.E. at
610. See also BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 662-63 (2d ed. 1955) (though pledgee not tech-
nically a trustee, general analogy holds true) ; Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreements,
29 HARv. L. REv. 277, 281 (1916).
15. E.g., Clapp v. Associated Depositors, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 686, 689 (D. Ohio 1940)
(pledge agreement gave right to sell at public or private sale, without advertisement; by
electing to sell at public sale, pledgee waives right to sell without advertisemeuat) ; Mel-
vindale State Bank v. Eckfeld, 283 Mich. 179,, 277 N.W. 876 (1938) (gratuitous promise
to sell collateral immediately waived contractual right to sell at any time); Toplitz v.
Bauer, 161 N.Y. 325, 55 N.E. 1059 (1900) (gratuitous time extension without specifying
new due date waives the pledgee's right to foreclose without notice).
16. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 702-03 (1939).
17. The burden is generally on the borrower to show the lender's bad faith. See Cam-
bridge Say. Bank v. Cronin, 289 Mass. 379, 194 N.E. 289 (1935). But see King v. D.
Sullivan & Co., 92 S.W. 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (burden shifts to pledgee if it is shown
that he sold for less than value of collateral).
18. 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955).
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waived his common law safeguards. In the summer of 1933 Kiamie pledged
all the outstanding shares of four small real estate holding corporations to
secure a $26,000 bank loan. The pledge agreement gave the bank the right,
upon default, to sell "at any time or times ... at public or private sale... with-
out demand, advertisement or notice, which are hereby waived," and to pur-
chase at such a sale. In November, 1933, the bank had the stocks sold by the
New York City auctioneer who handled most sales of this type.10 The day
before the sale and the day of the sale an advertisement in two New York City
morning newspapers had listed the stocks among about thirty other items to be
sold by the auctioneer. The only description was the number of shares, the
names of the corporations and the state of their incorporation. The bank itself
bid them in for $5,000. The New York Court of Appeals invalidated the sale
on the ground that the advertisement was inadequate, suggesting that it might
have shown what kind of business the corporations conducted, what their assets
and liabilities were, and that the shares offered for sale constituted all the out-
standing capital stock of the corporations.
20
19. Adrian H. Muller & Son. The surrogate held that "the proof also indicates that
the place of the public sale of the stock was one at which securities of that nature were
customarily sold." In the Matter of Kiamie, 191 Misc. 179, 186, 76 N.Y.S.2d 684, 691
(Surr. Ct. 1948), rev'd other grounds, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955). See also
Farmers' Nat'l Bank v. Venner, 192 Mass. 531, 536-37, 78 N.E. 540 (1906) (describing
same firm as largest auction business of securities in New York City). A survey of thk'
Wall Street Journal of the period shows that this auctioneer was virtually the only one tu
advertise such sales.
20. The court remitted the sale to the Surrogate's Court where very interesting
damage problems might be raised. A defective sale at which the pledgee himself becomes
the buyer is, in the absence of fraud, voidable, and does not constitute conversion. Jones
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 272 App. Div. 521, 74 N.Y.S.2d 498 (4th Dep't
1947) ; cases collected, Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1381, 1386 (1954) - BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
663 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEmENT, SEcuaRTy § 51 (1941). Contra, Linker v. Batavian NatI
Bank, 244 Wis. 459, 12 N.W.2d 721 (1944). However, the bank later sold the shares to
third persons at unadvertised private sales. The surrogate may hold that these private
sales were valid, even though the prior public sale was invalid. See note 35 infra. The
pledgor then can recover the difference between sale price and the amount of the loan less
costs and interest. However, if the private sale is also held improper, the bank would be
liable for conversion. BROWN, op. cit. spra § 136; JONES, COULTERAL SECUc TIES AND
PLEDGES § 571 (3d ed. 1912). The damages for conversion are, under the New York rule,
the highest market value of the securities during a reasonable interval after plaintiff
learns of the wrong. Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211 (1873) ; German v. Snedeker, 257 App.
Div. 596, 13 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 832, 24 N.E.2d 492 (1939) ; Jones
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, saepra; 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PRoPEaR 320-
21 (1937) ; McComuicx, DAMAGES 188-89 (1935) (reasonable period interpreted as a few
weeks or at most, two months).
In view of the post-war real estate boom, the Kiamie estate might seek a higher measure
of damages on the theory that New York should abandon the reasonable time rule and
revert to its former rule of highest value between conversion and trial. See Burt v. Dutcher,
34 N.Y. 492 (1866) ; Lobdell v. Stowell, 51 N.Y. 70 (1872) ; Groat v. Gile, 51 N.Y. 431
(1873). This rule has been used by two lower courts despite Baker v. Drake, supra, and
the numerous cases following it. Kavanaugh v. McIntyre, 74 Misc. 222, 133 N.Y. Supp.
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Although the Kiainie decision may be interpreted as following the precedent
established in a few jurisdictions, it may also be interpreted as imposing new
restrictions on the pledgee's freedom of contract. Kiamie is, in a narrow sense,
identical to some 'prior case law: a waiver of advertising applies only if the
sale is private; if the pledgee elects to sell publicly, inadequate advertising
voids the sale.2 1 But Kianije differs in two broader aspects. In nearly all prior
cases of this type, insufficient advertising was accompanied by at least a sug-
gestion of bad faith or inadequate price.22 And these cases all reasoned that
advertising was a necessary element of a public sale.23 But instead of referring
to the economic consequences, real or assumed, of inadequate advertising, the
Kiainie court invalidated the sale solely on principle. It specifically rejected
any implication of bad faith 24 and refused to overturn the lower court's find-
ing that the evidence failed to establish inadequacy of price.25 And the court
in fact gave no suggestion that it required a fair amount of advertisement only
because the bank elected to sell publicly. Kianue consequently can be inter-
preted as bringing advertisement within the category of judicial safeguards
679 (Sup. Ct. 1911) ; Plymouth Rubber Co. v. Knott, 114 Misc. 695, 187 N.Y. Supp. 914
(Mun. Ct. 1921).
The statute of limitations simplifies the damages problem in most cases, see N.Y. Civ.
PRac. AcT §§ 48, 49, but it does not bar the claim by the Kiamie estate. Although only
recently litigated, the action was brought within the requisite period. 309 N.Y. at 328, 130
N.E.2d at 746.
21 See cases cited notes 22 and 23 infra.
22. Eppert v. Lowish, 91 Ind. App. 231, 168 N.E. 616 (1929) (well secured bonds
worth $26,000 sold for $15,000) ; Tennent v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 345,
112 S.W. 754 (1908) (insurance company sold to itself in own office policy worth $244 for
$155) ; Huntingdon Valley Trust Co. v. Norristown-Penn Trust Co., 329 Pa. 356, 196 At.
R21 (1938) (bank sold to itself in own office mortgage for $25, later resold at a profit of
$13,000). But see Clapp v. Associated Depositors, 33 F. Supp. 686 (D. Ohio 1.940) (no
indication that price was not fair market value; however, sale was held in pledgee's office
with only employees present and pledgee made large profit on resale) ; Union & Mercan-
tile Trust Co. v. Harnwell, 158 Ark. 295, 250 S.W. 321 (1923) (same). In almost all such
cases of invalidation the pledgee himself bought the collateral.
23. E.g., Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harnwell, 158 Ark. 295, 303, 250 S.W. 321
(1923) (public sale without advertising would render pledge contract self-contradictory) ;
Mechanics & Metals Nat'l Bank v. Pingree, 40 Idaho 118, 232 Pac. 5 (1924) (election to
sell at public sale is waiver of right to sell without advertisement) ; Amarillo Nat'l Bank
v. Harrington, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 181, 131 S.W. 231, 232 (1910) (advertising essential
at public sale to attract bidders since auctioneer mhst sell even if the highest bid is wholly
inadequate). Contra, In re Mertens, 144 Fed. 818 (2d Cir. 1906), aff'd sub nor. Hiscock
v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S. 28 (1907) (interpreting New York law to allow unadvertised
public sale).
24. 309 N.Y. at 331, 130 N.E.2d at 748.
25. 191 Misc. at 187, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 691. This finding was before the Court of Appeals;
,,ne of the grounds of appeal was that the surrogate had erroneously excluded evidence
tending to show that the pledgee bank and its agents profited greatly by the resale of the
collateral. Brief for Appellants, pp. 70-73, In the Matter of Kiamie, 309 N.Y. 325, 130
N.E.2d 745 (1955). The Court of Appeals, however, mentioned neither the question of
adequacy of price nor this probative evidence.
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which cannot be waived by the borrower.2 6 And this interpretation may extend
to the other common law safeguards; it may restrict the pledgee's freedom to
bargain for the power to sell without notice to the pledgor, to sell quickly, or
even to sell privately. 27
Regardless of the interpretation followed, Kianmie should not apply to the
sale of collateral whenever its value can be readily ascertained from published
market reports.2 8 When there is a recognized market for the collateral, the
pledgee can by definition find willing buyers at the market price, but has vir-
tually no possibility of obtaining a higher price.2 9 In these cases, therefore.
price alone is normally an adequate criterion for judging the sale,30 provided
the pledgee is required to give notice to the pledgor of the time and manner
26. There is language in the opinion which encourages such an interpretation: "the
power conferred on the pledgee by this note to sell at public or private sale and without
advertisement or notice, leaves intact the law's own requirement that every such sale be
conducted in good faith .... While the pledgee under such an agreement may become the
purchaser . . . , his exercise of that right makes it all the more necessary that the law's
insistence on ample notice [by advertisement] be heeded." 309 N.Y. at 331, 130 N.E.2d
at 748. See 11 THE RECORD OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 84, 86
(1.956) ("the Court... may well have established standards which must be complied with
in order to safely sell stock of little known corporations").
27. But this interpretation cannot be extended to rule out all waivers in the pledge
agreement; the court held that, although an unadvertised public sale was invalid, the pledge
agreement had effectively waived the pledgor's right to any specific statutory standard of
advertising. For this reason, the court declined to decide whether in the absence of a
waiver the advertisement requirement of § 202 of the New York Lien Law would apply.
309 N.Y. at 331,130 N.E.2d at 748.
28. Since they represent liquidated claims, savings bank pass books and life insurance
policies should not be subject to the Kiamie courts reasoning whenever the debtors' free
reserves or asset/liability ratios are regulated by state or federal law. Their value is then
readily determinable-the total deposit recorded in the pass book or the cash surrender
value stated in the policy. Cf. Hamilton v. R. S. Dickson & Co., 85 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1907);
UNIFORM COMMMERCIAL CODE § 3-802 (1).
This proposal, together with the exception suggested in note 52 infra, will probably
exclude most pledge foreclosures from the Kiamie rationale. See letter from Harold H.
Kaufman, Vice-President, Manufacturers Trust Co., New York, June 7, 1956, on file with
Yale Law Journal: "The collateral most commonly pledged will consist of marketable
stocks and bonds and to a lesser degree . . . of life insurance policies, savings bank pass
books, warehouse receipts, etc. It is unusual to take stock of closely held corporations."
29. But see Cole v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 164 Misc. 741, 747, 750, 299 N.Y. Supp.
418, 427, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1.937). The court invalidated a private sale at which the pledgee
sold the collateral, stocks and bonds, to himself at market price. The court held that mar-
ket price is not necessarily the highest price obtainable since an interested party desirinp
to keep the securities off the market or to secure control of a corporation might pay more
than market price. See also 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 26 (1937). The fact
that the pledgor had not been notified before the sale seems a better reason for invalidation*
as the court pointed out, the date of private sale is difficult to ascertain, and the pledgee
might claim to have sold at a date when the market was low.
30. See Klapp v. Bache, 229 App. Div. 415, 242 N.Y. Supp. 155 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 255




of sale.3 ' For the pledgor can, after receiving notice, ascertain the market price
from published reports and, if the pledgee sells for less, establish his legal claim
to the difference. 32 Thus, the lender should be required only to give the pledgor
notice of the sale at the time the sale is made; for any additional requirements,
such as advertisement, would harm both lenders and borrowers by needlessly
increasing the costs of foreclosure. Of course the sale itself is always subject
to an overriding requirement of commercial reasonableness. The pledgor can-
not, for example, break the market by dumping large blocks of stock,33 nor
deliberately choose the weaker of two convenient markets. 34
However, if the collateral has no such readily ascertainable market value,
neither interpretation of Kianie is adequate. The narrow interpretation will
continue the anomalous results reached in prior cases: if the pledgee buys the
collateral at an unadvertised public sale, the sale is invalid but the pledgee can
later sell the same collateral privately without advertisement.3 5 Nor have ade-
quacy of price and good faith been satisfactory criteria for judging the pledgee's
conduct.3 0 For a pledgee may act in good faith and still not obtain an adequate
31. See note 22 supra. Contra, Estes v. Perkins, supra note 30.
32. Southern Exchange Bank v. Langston, 33 Ga. App. 477, 127 S.E. 230 (1.925) ; Cox
v. Republic Nat'l Co., 112 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Brukas v. Union Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co., 345 Pa. 15, 26 A.2d 663 (1942) (dictum). Courts generally admit into
evidence published market reports when they appear to be reliable. 6 WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1704 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, 45 MicH. L. REv. 748 (1947). See, e.g., Webber v.
Urnback, 125 Kan. 117, 263 Pac. 786 (1928) ; Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird
Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1953).
Since the pledgor can replace his readily marketable collateral, he will be made whole
in these cases by the difference between the market price and the sale price, plus interest
from the date of sale. A conversion rule of damages which may, in addition, make the
pledgee liable to the pledgor for an increase in the market price after the sale, see note 20
supra, would not be compensatory but punitive.
33. Hudgens v. Chamberlain, 161 Cal. 710, 120 Pac. 422 (1911) (by dumping all
pledged shares on market at one time, pledgee depreciated price to two thirds normal value;
pledgor could recover damage suffered).
34. Jennings v. Moore, 189 Mass. 197, 75 N.E. 214 (1905) (stock of local New Hamp-
shire railroad sold in Boston, where unknown, for one-tenth of market value in New
Hampshire) ; see Mechanics & 'Metals Nat'l Bank v. Pingree, 40 Idaho 118, 232 Pac. 5
(1924) (pledgor sold promissory notes in New York, makers were well known in Idaho).
35. Clapp v. Associated Depositors, 33 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (D. Ohio 1.940) ; Hunt-
ingdon Valley Trust Co. v. Norristown-Penn Trust Co., 329 Pa. 356, 196 At. 821 (1938).
Contra, Lowe v. Ozmun, 3 Cal. App. 387, 86 Pac. 729 (1906).
36. Inadequacy of price alone will not invalidate a sale. Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118
Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953) ; Castro v. Linchitz, 297 Mass. 381, 8 N.E.2d 744
(1937) ; General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238 (1949) ; BROWN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY 666-67 (2d ed. 1955); see UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 9-507(2).
But see Cox v. Republic Nat'l Co., 112 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1.937) (sale in-
validated because stocks were sold for about 93% of "reasonable market value"); cf.
Brukas v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Pa. 15, 26 A.2d 663 (1942) (readily market-
able collateral must be sold for market price). This principle is also followed in cases of
nonjudicial foreclosure of mortgages under power of sale clauses. 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1550 (3d ed. 1939). Yet, a grossly inadequate price may create an inference of
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price 3 7 and it is often extremely difficult to determine what a fair price would
have been.38 'Ioreover, the pledgee may, as in Kiamie, act in good faith by
following prevailing commercial practice 3' but fail to safeguard the borrower's
interests because prevailing practice is objectionable.
A better solution can be reached by accepting Kiainie's broader implication
-a clause in the pledge agreement waiving advertisement is invalid. The
courts have long recognized that freedom of contract will not justify every
waiver by the borrower; they refuse to recognize a waiver of the pledgor's
equity of redemption 40 and, in a few cases, his right to public sale.41 Other
waivers in the pledge agreement should be similarly invalidated. For as long1
as lenders are free to broaden the waiver language of their pledge agreements,
fraud or bad faith. See Coleman v. Solomon, 225 Ala. 407, 143 So. 576 (1932) ; Wade v.
Markwell & Co., 113 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953) : Jennings v. Moore, 139 Mass.
197,75 N.E. 214 (1905).
37. See, e.g., Winchester Rock & Brick Co. v. Murdough, 233 Mass. 50, 123 N.E. 344
(1919) ; Continental & Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Ricker, 330 Mo. 75, 49 S.W.2d 20 (1932).
38. See 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 22-39 (1937) ; cf. Clapp v. Associatcd
Depositors, 33 F. Supp. 686, 689-90 (D. Ohio 1940). This is especially true when, as in the
present case, there is a long time lapse between sale and trial. In the Matter of Kiamie,
191 Misc. 179, 187, 76 N.Y.S.2d 684, 691 (Surr. Ct. 1948), rev'd other grounds, 309 N.Y.
325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955). The pledgor generally has the burden of proving inadequacy
of price. Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S. 28, 39 (1907).
39. 191 Misc. at 186, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 691. See Seasongood, Drastic Pledae Agreements,
29 HARv. L. REv. 277, 282 (1916) (indicating that the kind of advertisement used in the
present case is a "common form").
Of course, the fact that such advertisement was common practice does not mean that
it was reasonable. In the December 27, 1933 issue of the Wall Street Journal, for example,
a single advertisement lists some 300 items, all in very small print. Although stocks and
bonds were the most common items, automobiles, patent rights, personal notes, contract
rights, country club memberships and other heterogeneous items were frequently conglom-
erated. Such advertisements, undoubtedly ill-designed to attract inquiry, seem little more
than a formality.
40. See, e.g., Alcolea v. Smith, 150 La. 482, 90 So. 769 (1921) (traces invalidity of
forfeiture clause back to edict of Constantine) ; Williams v. Schmeltz. 14 S.W.2d 966, 967
(Mo. App. 1929) ; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 661 (2d ed. 1955). T he same rule is fol-
lowed in mortgage cases. See, e.g., Mooney v. Byrne, 163 N.Y. 86, 58 N.E. 190 (1900)
Cohn v. Bridgeport Plumbing Supply Co., 96 Conn. 696, 115 Atl. 328 (1921).
For validity of forfeiture agreements concluded subsequent to original transaction, see
note 42 infra.
41. This is the minority view, and it is limited to cases where the pledgee bought the
collateral himself. See, c.g., United Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 30 Ariz. 557, 249 Pac. 747
(1926) ; Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harnwell, 158 Ark. 295, 250 S.W. 321 (1923).
The majority allow private sale to the pledgee, if the pledge agreement so provides. E...,
Englert v. First Nat'l Bank, 333 Pa. 297, 5 A.2d 136 (1939) ; cases collected in BRowN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY 664 n.42 (2d ed. 1955). Some courts qualify their approval, howul'er.
Cole v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 164 Misc. 741, 299 N.Y. Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (ni
private sale to pledgee unless well advertised, thus giving third parties opportunity ti
make offers).




the courts will have increasing difficulty in protecting borrowers from abuse;
they can only distort the meaning of the contract or include a broader range
of conduct within the definitions of bad faith and waiver by the lender. Instead
of these undisciplined devices, the borrower should be protected by forthright
rejection of waiver clauses.42 But the Kianije court did not complete the analy-
sis. If the borrower's safeguards can not be waived, they should not become
an unreasonable burden on the lender. The courts should require no more than
necessary to insure adequate protection of the borrower. And these require-
ments should be clearly defined.4 3  Imprecise standards encourage litigation
and may lead commercial lending institutions to take unnecessary precautions ;44
each of these consequences will increase the cost of loans.
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-501(3), 9-504(2) (invalidating waivers of the
pledgor's right to notice) ; cf. UIFORm CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 13 (same for condi-
tional vendee) ; UNIFoRm TRUsr REIPTS AcT § 6(3) (b) (same for trustee). Contra,
Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreements, 29 HARV. L. REV. 277, 279 (1916) ("Notwith-
standing, however, such agreements may appear in some aspects harsh and drastic, the
courts should, and do, attempt to carry out rather than strike down such compacts, pre-
serving the rights of the pledgor by strict construction and by requiring exercise, in his
behalf, of the utmost good faith.").
Although waiver in the pledge agreement should be disallowed, it seems desirable to
permit the pledgor to enter a waiver agreement after, or just before, default. Both pledgor
and pledgee may then agree that a particular speedy and inexpensive way of selling the
collateral would be most advantageous to both parties. An agreement of this type should
be upheld, particularly since arm's length negotiation seems more likely after the borrower
has received his loan. But if a post-loan waiver is given in consideration of additional
credit or a time extension, it should be invalidated unless the waiver appears to be com-
mercially reasonable for both parties.
RZSTATEMENT, SECURITY § 55 seems to consider the parties' bargaining position more
nearly equal after the loan has been concluded. It permits an agreement made at that time
which provides that the collateral may be retained by the pledgee and applied on the debt.
'rhe lurden is then on the pledgee to show that the agreement is free from fraud and
oppression. See Cunningham v. Jones, 108 Ky. 728, 57 S.W. 488 (1900), and cases col-
lected Annot., 24 A.L.R. 829-31 (1923). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505 (2)
(secured party may give notice to the debtor of a proposal to keep the security in satis-
faction of the debt; unless debtor objects within thirty days, creditor may do so).
43. For example, Kianie refused to establish rules by which lenders may, in the future,
guide their conduct: "[W]e find it impossible to announce detailed rules applicable to
every such notice of sale." More important, while the court noted several items of infor-
mation which might have been included in the advertisement, it carefully avoided saying
that all of these items were essential, or, on the other hand, would have been sufficient.
309 N.Y. at 331, 130 N.E.2d at 748.
44. Commercial lenders rightly demand a high degree of certainty. Brief for the New
Yorl: State Bankers Association, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Motion for Leave to
Reargue, p. 9, In the Matter of Kiamie, rearg. denied, 1 N.Y.2d 859 (1956). As an in-
dication of the uncertainty created, see 11 THE RECORD OF THE Ass'x OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK 84, 86 (1956) ("These standards may require placing extremely ex-
tensive information in published notices and may puse serious questions in connection with
the drafting of notices."). See also McNaughton, A Business Han's Opinion of the Law,
60RE. L. REv. 108, 111 ( 1920).
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First, private sales should be permitted. Allowing only public sales may seem
an attractive rule, for it would greatly reduce the possibility of controversy
later arising between lender and borrower. Indeed, this approach has been
adopted in French law.45 But public sale, particularly an auction sale, often
fails to bring as high a price as does a private sale through normal channels of
commerce 46 where the lender can negotiate with businessmen who regularly
buy products similar or identical to the collateral.
Secondly, the pledgee should be able to buy in the collateral at public sale.
True, the lender may buy at an inadequate price. One solution would be to
adopt the English rule of precluding any purchase of the collateral by the
lender.47 But the danger of an inadequate bid is less in public sales than in
private sales where the borrower has little opportunity to determine whether
the lender might have obtained a higher offer. Moreover, in public sales the
lender may pay a higher price than any competing bidder would be willing to
pay, since the lender is likely to have better knowledge of the true value of the
collateral. 48 And he may bid high for fear that an inadequate price will lead
to judicial invalidation.4 9
Courts should therefore preserve to borrowers and lenders the advantages
of both public sales to pledgees and private sales to third persons,50 but should
obviate the dangers inherent in such sales by prescribing rules for their con-
45. SEGALL, LA RAALISATION AMIABLE DU GAGE 108-15 (1936).
46. See note 7 supra. Despite this fact, private sales are usually avoided by pledgees
for fear that such sales will be challenged in the courts. Letter from Harold H. Kaufmann,
Vice-President, Manufacturers Trust Co., New York, June 7, 1956, on file with Yale Law
Journal.
47. ATTENBOROUGH, PAWNBROKERS 30 (1925) (this does not apply to loans under £10
made by pawnbrokers); 23 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 439 (2d ed. 1936); ASH-
BURNER, MORTGAGES 76 (2d ed. 1911). This rule has its roots in Roman law. OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES § 342 n.8 (1951). Since he cannot buy the collateral himself, the English
mortgagee "take[s] care he gets good value for the property, apart from any fear of action
for improper sale." Turner, An English View of M1ortgage Deficiency Judgments, 21 VA.
L. REv. 601, 605 (1.935). As a result, suits to set aside foreclosure sales are relatively in-
frequent. See 23 HALSBURY, op. cit. supra at 436 n.rn; cases collected in 35 ENGLISH AND
EMPIRE DIGEST 499-505 (1927) ; 37 id. 14-17.
48. See Cole v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 164 Misc. 741, 747, 299 N.Y. Supp. 418, 426
(Sup. Ct. 1937) (purpose of allowing pledgee to bid is to stimulate competition) ; see also
WALSH, MORTGAGES 350 (1934) (mortgagee should be able to protect his security by bid-
ding up the sale). This argument has less validity in private sales than in public sales,
since private sales through usual commercial channels are better calculated to reach trade
buyers whose experience will help them recognize the value of the collateral.
49. Turner, supra note 47 (recognizing "fear of action for improper sale" as a factor
influencing the pledgee's bidding).
50. The fact that in well over half of all public foreclosure sales the secured party
becomes the buyer emphasizes the need to encourage both better advertised public sales and
private sales to third persons; persons who attend public sales are seldom aware of the




duct.5" The pledgee should be required to advertise the collateral 52 and to give
timely notice to the pledgor of the time, place, and manner of sale.53 Notice
gives the pledgor every opportunity of redemption, provides ample opportunity
for both parties to look for potential buyers, and, at least in case of public sales,
permits the borrower to attend the sale to assure that it is conducted proper-
ly.5 4 Public advertisement should also be required in all cases. The advertise-
ment should of course specify the time, manner and place of sale. It should
identify the collateral and the pledgee.r The collateral should be described in
51. In noncommercial situations, French law permits the pledgee to buy the collateral,
but only at a price set by an independent appraiser. SEGALL, LA RkALISATION AMIABLE DU
GAGE 51-52 (1946). Although appraisal may be helpful, it should not be mandatory. The
pledgee should be able to buy readily marketable collateral at private sale without in-
curring the cost of appraisal in each case, since the pledge's value can be determined when-
ever inadequacy of price is alleged. See note 28 supra. And in other cases, it seems un-
likely that a sale with appraisal will net a higher price than that obtainable at a sale con-
ducted under rules designed to attract competitive bids. See notes 54-60 infra and accom-
panying text.
52. The advertisement requirements proposed herein will, of course, increase the cost
of foreclosure. In large loans, the cost is, percentage-wise, a reasonable price of safe-
guarding borrowers. And pawnbrokers, who normally have a high volume of small loans
and a high volume of foreclosures, can readily distribute the cost of advertising collateral
of little value. In fact, all states regulate pawnbrokers, many requiring public auctions,
advertising or other safeguards. For a discussion of the problem, a digest of the state laws,
and a proposed Uniform Pawnbroking Bill, see RABY, THE REGULATION OF PAWNBROKING
(1924). But other lenders-primarily commercial banks-whose relatively small volume
will not permit wide distribution of advertising costs should not be required to advertise
collateral pledged to secure loans of, for instance, $100 or less.
53. Notice of sale should be deemed sufficient if in writing, and either (a) personally
served on the pledgor, or (b) sent by ordinary mail to his last known business address.
See UNIFORm TRusT REcErPrs ACT § 6(3) (b) ; United States Trust Co. v. Blundon, 42
App. D.C. 500, 507 (1914) (pledgee must show that notice was mailed). Contra, Stearns
v. Marsh, 4 Denio 227 (N.Y. 1847) (if the pledgor cannot be found, judicial foreclosure
must be resorted to in the absence of a waiver of notice).
54. National Bank v. Baker, 128 Ill. 533, 21 N.E. 510 (1889); Dimock v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 55 N.J.L. 296, 25 Atl. 926 (1896) ; Davis v. Funk, 39 Pa. 243 (1861).
See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 658 (2d ed. 1955) ; COLBBROOKE, COLLATERAL SECURITIES
221 (2d ed. 1898).
55. See Seasongood, Drastic Pledge Agreements, 29 HARV. L. REv. 277, 282-83 (1916).
The author proposes that the advertisement should, in addition, disclose the pledgor's name,
the fact that this is a pledge foreclosure, and the amount of the debt.
"If. . . a considerable sum has been advanced on the assumed worth of the pledge,
this tends to appreciate the value of the pledged security in the eyes of the public.
While, of course the lender may have relied largely on the financial strength of the
maker of the obligation and but little on the security, yet the converse may be true,
and only by knowing all the facts can the public make up its mind which is probably
the case."
Ibid. See Wade v. Markwell & Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953) (advertise-
ment should contain statement of amount of debt). This idea is sometimes used in real
estate mortgage foreclosures. See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 544; statutes collected in
WALSH, MORTGAGES 345 (1934). But in the pledge context the amount of the debt is too
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sufficient detail to attract inquiry from potential buyers. When the collateral
consists of stock, the advertisement should state the number of shares or, if a
controlling interest is involved, the percentage of outstanding shares being
offered 56 and it should describe the corporation's principal asset-for example,
the location and size of real estate in the case of a holding company or the
principal product and plant capacity of a manufacturerY In other cases, the
description should again be as specific as a short classified advertisement can
be-the weight, cut and color of a diamond, the style and type of pelt in a fur
coat, 58 the maker, face amount, rate of interest, date and maturity of a promis-
sory note.5 9 To enable prospective bidders to investigate further before the
sale, the advertisement should state how, and from whom, they can obtain
further information. The lender should be required to advertise that informa-
tion can be obtained directly from the pledgor or a person designated by him;
for the pledgor usually has the best information on the value of the collateral
and the opportunity to contact inquirers himself will preclude a later claim
that the lender withheld information in order to suppress bids from outsiders.
Thus the lender should be required to notify the pledgor before advertising in
order to permit him to decide whether the advertisement should give his own
name or that of his nominee. To attract buyers as well as to permit investiga-
tion the lender should continue the advertisements for a reasonable period
before selling the collateral. °
often misleading, not only for the reason stated by Seasongood himself, but also because
the collateral may have greatly depreciated in value, between the time the loan is made
and the time of foreclosure.
56. See In the Matter of Kiamie, 309 N.Y. 325, 130 N.E.2d 745 (1955). See also
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956) (showing that the
price paid for controlling stock often greatly exceeds the quoted market value).
57. The advertisement need contain neither all the information a careful investor
would require before buying, nor the disclosure required by the Securities Act of 1933. It
should contain enough easily available information to identify the collateral and thereby
spur potential buyers to investigate.
In some circumstances, however, a pledgee foreclosing on collateral might be subject
to the disclosure requirements of § 10 of the Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 81, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(j) (1952). If the collateral consisted of a controlling interest in a corporation, the
pledgee might be regarded as an underwriter under § 2(11). The statute probably does
not confer underwriter status on the pledgee when the loan is made. Loss, SECURITIEs
REGULATION 346 (1951.); Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the
Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 124 (1937). However, when the
collateral is sold, the broad disclosure policies behind the act might place the pledgee with-
in the ambit of § 2(11). See In the Matter of Ira Haupt & Co., SEC Release No. 3845
(Aug. 21, 1946).
58. Wade v. Markvell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497 (1953) (collateral
should have been advertised as a full length, natural Eastern mink coat).
59. Cf. Mechanics & Metals Nat'l Bank v. Pingree, 40 Idaho 118, 232 Pac. 5 (1924)
(even this advertisement, however, was insufficient when it appeared only twice in a news-
paper and the notes were sold in a distant market where makers were unknown).
60. In many states statutes may guide the courts in determining the sufficiency of the
advertisement. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 986 (real estate must be advertised
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NOTES
The courts, rather than the legislatures, should fix the standards for sales
by pledgees. To be workable, a statute must be specific enough to accommo-
date both unusual circumstances and changes in business practices. The drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code apparently recognized that this is virtually
impossible; the Code requires only commercial reasonableness,6 ' leaving to the
courts the task of developing more specific standards. For this task the courts
are well equipped. Since they announce their decisions in the context of specific
factual situations, the courts can indicate the market conditions, business prac-
tices and other current economic conditions which influenced their decisions.
Thus commercial lenders can be alerted to accommodate their foreclosure pro-
cedures to changing conditions. But if the courts fail to develop clear standards,
the legislatures should regulate pledge foreclosures consistently with the in-
terests of both parties .
2
twice weekly for three weeks before judgment sale) ; N.Y. LEN LAw § 202 (once a week
for two consecutive weeks).
In the case of perishables, the requirements of advertisement should be relaxed. "Perish-
ables" should be construed in the physical sense, not market value sense. In cases of
rapidly falling market of stocks, advertising and notice requirements can always be set
aside by mutual agreement. See note 42 supra. Since it is a matter of opinion whether or
not stocks will continue to decline, a unilateral right to dispense with advertising and
notice requirements could easily lead to abuse. See Small v. Housman, 208 N.Y. 1.15, 101
N.E. 700 (1913) (reasonable notice of sale required before stocks can be sold in declining
market). But see Un~omt CONMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(2) (notice required unless col-
lateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value).
For discussion of the problem of when the collateral must be sold, and how much of it
can be sold if it is divisible, see Note, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 1087, 1090-91 (1941).
61. UNIFORM COMMERCLXL CODE § 9-504(2).
62. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Sone Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUm. L. REv. 629, 633 (1943) (noting that legislation became necessary in the in-
surance field because the courts caused too much uncertainty by trying to protect a party
in an unequal bargaining position while, at the same time, struggling to respect freedom
of contracts).
